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INTRODUCTION
“Wait a minute, that’s the guy from The Cosby Show,” a man 
muttered, directing his wife’s attention to a middle-aged man bagging 
groceries and donning a stained Trader Joe’s uniform shirt.1 The couple
recognized an older, heavier Geoffrey Owens, most well-known for 
playing Elvin Tibideaux on The Cosby Show.2 After spending more than
15 years on The Cosby Show, Geoffrey’s fame wore off.3 Days after this
couple spotted Geoffrey at the grocery store, however, the Daily Mail 
published an online article featuring pictures of Geoffrey in his work
clothes.4 The title exclaimed, “From Learning Lines to Serving the Long 
Line!”5 Geoffrey’s life as a “has-been celebrity” disappeared in an instant.6 
Although he currently leads the life of a private individual, if a reporter
published dishonest headlines, it is unlikely that Geoffrey would find relief 
in court due to his history as a public figure.7 Geoffrey would face the 
burden of proving that the alleged defamation was made with knowledge
of or reckless disregard for the truth—also known as actual malice—under 
the United States Supreme Court’s 1969 ruling in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.8 
Courts still apply the defamation standard created in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan9 and Gertz v. Robert Welch.10 Through these landmark
1. From Learning Lines to Serving the Long Line! The Cosby Show Star 
Geoffrey Owens Is Spotted Working as a Cashier at Trader Joe’s in New Jersey,
DAILY MAIL (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6116 
357/The-Cosby-star-Geoffrey-Owens-spotted-working-cashier-Trader-Joes-New 
-Jersey.html [https://perma.cc/X7U2-NPX9]. 




6. Erin Clements, Geoffrey Owens Reveals What His ‘Bizarre’ Year Taught 
Him, TODAY (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.today.com/popculture/geoffrey-owens-
reveals-what-bizarre-year-taught-him-t144697 [https://perma.cc/P35U-TUR7]. 
7. This is a hypothetical situation—Geoffrey was not actually subject to
defamation, nor did he pursue a lawsuit. 
8. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. Id.
10. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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5432020] COMMENT
cases, the United States Supreme Court reformed defamation law by 
requiring that public officials and public figures11 prove the defendant— 
the speaker of the defamatory statements—acted with actual malice.12 The 
consequence of this requirement is two-fold. First, the Supreme Court 
aimed to safeguard the balance between private individuals’ interest in
privacy and the press’s freedom of speech.13 Additionally, the Supreme 
Court narrowed the scope of defamation plaintiffs that will prevail due to 
the heightened requirement of proving actual malice.14 
The digital revolution, however, has transformed the media landscape
in a way the Supreme Court could not have foreseen.15 Reporters, who 
could potentially become defamation defendants, no longer rely on the 
morning newspaper or broadcast networks to publish articles; instead, they 
turn to online sources and social media.16 Reporters now have instant
access to sources from around the world for research before publication,
rather than their traditional limitation to locally based print sources.17 
Furthermore, public officials and public figures can bypass the media and
respond to false allegations directly to the public through social media 
platforms.18 The consequences of the digital revolution beckon the
11. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), officially applied
actual malice to public figures, but Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974), 
articulated the distinctions between private individuals and public figures. 
12. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254.
13. Id. at 270–72.
14. Id.
15. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254; see Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried,
News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017, PEW RES. CTR.: JOURNALISM &
MEDIA (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-
social-media-platforms-2017/ [https://perma.cc/4DQJ-A7KK] (“As of August
2017, two-thirds (67%) of Americans report that they get at least some of their
news on social media . . . . For the first time[,] . . . more than half (55%) of 
Americans ages 50 or older report getting news on social media sites.”); 
Newspapers Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. JOURNALISM & MEDIA (July 9, 
2019), http://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/ [https://perma.cc/S6S
5-E9E7] (last visited on Oct. 15, 2019) (noting that declines were highest in print
circulation: “Weekday print circulation decreased 12% and Sunday circulation 
decreased 13%” from 2017 to 2018) (demonstrating that circulation of weekday 
newspapers has decreased by 51% from 1964 to 2017); State of the News Media,
PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/state-of-the-news-media/
[https://perma.cc/2478-72T8] (last visited Sept. 6, 2018) (stating that the approach 
to studying data has “evolved along with the industry”). 
16. See Shearer & Gottfried, supra note 15.
17. See discussion infra Section II.A.
18. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.
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544 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Supreme Court to modernize defamation law and rebalance the interests
at stake by creating a new class of defamation plaintiffs.
Two major problems have come to light. First, the courts struggle to 
distinguish between active public figures who enjoy the benefits of self-
help and inactive public figures who do not. Second, applying the New
York Times standard in the digital world promulgates an imbalance
between the rights of the press and the rights of individuals. The 
appropriate way to remedy these problems is to apply a three-question,
two-factor test (“3-2 Test”) to determine which plaintiffs need to prove 
actual malice. This test first considers whether the plaintiff is a private
citizen or a public figure. If the plaintiff is a public figure, or was a public 
figure at any point during the plaintiff’s lifetime, the court will determine
whether the plaintiff is active or inactive.19 Active public figures are those
who seek media attention and are able to use their public notoriety to refute 
false claims, while inactive public figures cannot.20 Thus, the court will
examine whether the plaintiff has access to traditional channels of 
communication or modern methods of rebuttal to classify the plaintiff as 
active or inactive. If the plaintiff is inactive, the court will then determine
whether the controversy surrounding the alleged defamation is the same
as or different from the controversy that gave rise to the plaintiff’s original 
public figure status.21 
The analysis will result in three possible burdens of proof. First, active
public figures will be responsible for proving that the defendant acted with 
actual malice. Second, private parties and inactive public figures with
unrelated controversies will not need to meet the actual malice standard.
Third, in cases of inactive public figures with related controversies, the 
burden will shift to the defendant to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that he was not negligent. The 3-2 Test creates an intermediate
category that allows a just result for public figures who are no longer in 
the public eye in the digital age.
19. The Fifth Circuit briefly discussed the term “active” public figure in 
Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1257 (5th Cir. 1980). The 
Fifth Circuit did not, however, find that reversing public status was appropriate. 
The Fifth Circuit referred to a distinction in the “active” period of a public figure’s
fame. This Comment derives the term “active” from Brewer but argues that
distinguishing between “active” and “inactive” requires more than an analysis of 
the breadth of current media coverage.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. Distinguishing the types of controversy involved will allow the court to 
determine if a plaintiff should be treated as a private individual or public figure.
Controversies related to the status of the plaintiff are more likely to be subject to 
public comment and debate.
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  267 4/15/20  8:48 AM




   
  
   
    
  
   
    
     
    
   
  
     
    
  
    
    
  
   
    
 
  
    
   
   
   
 
     
 
     
      
     
    
 
   
     
       
        
    
    
5452020] COMMENT
Part I of this Comment analyzes the background of the public figure
designation. Part I also details the evolution of the actual malice standard 
and investigates the process of categorizing plaintiffs as public figures.
Part II briefly summarizes the relevant history of mass media, including 
the impact of the digital revolution in the early 2000s. Additionally, Part 
II discusses how the internet and social media have altered the traditional 
methods of plaintiff categorization. Part III presents the problem new
media has created for public figure status retention. Finally, Part IV argues
for distinguishing public figures into two new subcategories, provides
factors to assist courts in categorizing, and describes a method for applying 
the actual malice standard going forward.22 
I. A POLICE COMMISSIONER, AN ATHLETIC DIRECTOR, AND A LAWYER 
ALLEGE DEFAMATION . . .
Prior to 1964, courts treated defamation as a type of strict liability
under state tort law.23 In its pioneering New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
decision, however, the Supreme Court reformed defamation law by 
applying a heightened burden of proof—actual malice—to plaintiffs who
were public officials.24 In subsequent cases, the Court expanded the scope
of New York Times to include public figures and distinguished public
figures from private citizens.25 
A. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Actual Malice
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court aimed to balance the
privacy interests of individuals with the press’s interest in free speech.26 
The landmark case guarantees that public figures bear a higher burden for 
proving defamatory statements.27 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its
22. For purposes of this solution, designation as a general public figure,
limited-purpose public figure, or public official is not necessary. The solution only 
requires that the plaintiff was at one time a public figure or a public official. 
23. Elsa Ransom, The Ex-Public Figure: A Libel Plaintiff Without a Class, 5
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 389, 392 (1995).
24. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
26. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254 at 272.
27. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254. The New York Times standard is not
limited to media defendants. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A,
cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 1976). Further, this Comment and the solution it presents are
limited to media defendants. For a discussion on whether the New York Times 
standard applies to non-media defendants, see Erik Walker, Defamation Law: 
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  268 4/15/20  8:48 AM








    
  
  
    
 
    
  
    
    
   
    
    
  
      
     
  





       
 
      
  
 
    
    
    
    
    
   
    
    
  
 
         
      
546 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
progeny provide the guiding principles courts use to determine the
plaintiff’s burden of proof.28 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the New York Times printed alleged 
false statements regarding L.B. Sullivan, one of three elected
Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama.29 The 
advertisement included statements dictating that members of the Civil 
Rights Movement faced an alleged “wave of terror” in Montgomery.30 
Although the advertisement did not mention him by name, Sullivan argued
that readers would easily infer that the statements were written about
him.31 Specifically, Sullivan argued that due to the writer’s use of vague
pronouns in the statements, the readers of the article would presume that
he participated in acts of violence toward Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.32 
The Court found that the Alabama law requiring a mere showing of 
injury to a person’s “reputation, profession, trade, or business”33 could 
potentially deter free speech surrounding public officials and their duties.34 
The Court held that the burden of proof in cases involving public officials
who allege defamation in regard to their official conduct, fitness, or roles
must be more stringent.35 The Court reasoned that this heightened burden
of proof, actual malice, is necessary to protect the freedom of speech and
freedom of the press within the Constitution—specifically in the First 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.36 Under the actual malice
standard, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the defendant had 
knowledge of falsity or acted in reckless disregard of the truth.37 The Court
recognized that such a high burden on the plaintiff may allow defendants 
to make some false statements without repercussions, but the Court 
Public Figures—Who Are They, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 957 n.14 (1993);
Ransom, supra note 23, at 395.
28. Id. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publ’g.
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971).
29. Id. at 256. 
30. Id.
31. Id. at 259. 
32. Id. at 256.
33. Id. at 263.
34. Id. at 279.
35. Id. at 265. 
36. Id. (holding that the restriction is based on “a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A, cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1976).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A, cmt. e.
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  269 4/15/20  8:48 AM




   
  
     
  
   
    
    
  
    
   
    
   
  
     
   
      
    
    
     
 
    
   
   
   
    
    
   
 
    
 
     
   
    
    
      
  
 
   
 
   
   
5472020] COMMENT
reasoned that the protection of free debate outweighed the potential
harm.38 
Only three years later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court 
broadened the actual malice standard.39 The Court found that the
heightened standard applied to public figures, arguing that the similarities 
between public officials and public figures were plentiful and the 
distinctions were increasingly blurred.40 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
consolidated two separate libel cases.41 First, Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts began with a published article that accused Wally Butts, University
of Georgia’s (“UGA”) Athletic Director, of “fixing” a football game
against the University of Alabama.42 At the time, Butts was well-known 
for his coaching and had considered coaching football at the professional 
level.43 The article alleged that Butts revealed UGA’s tactics, plays, and 
football secrets to Paul Bryant, head coach of the Alabama football team.44 
The article led to Butts’s resignation, and Butts then brought suit.45 
Second, the Curtis Publishing Court considered the appeal of
Associated Press v. Walker.46 The plaintiff, Walker, was a private
individual who played a large role in the 1957 school segregation 
confrontation in Little Rock, Arkansas.47 Prior to the confrontation,
Walker retired from the United States Army and obtained a fair amount of
political prominence.48 In a news broadcast, an eyewitness alleged that
Walker made an effort to prevent an African American student from 
38. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254 at 271–72 (“Erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression 
are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”) (quoting
NAACP. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
39. See generally Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
40. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren noted that
“differentiation between ‘public figures’ and ‘public officials’ and adoption of
separate standards of proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or First
Amendment policy.” Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967)
(Warren, C.J., concurring).
41. Id. at 135 (Harlan, J., plurality).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 135. 
44. Id. at 136. 
45. Id. at 137. The trial judge found that Butts was not a public official; thus,
the actual malice standard was not applicable. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. Id. at 139. 
46. Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. 130; Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 
28 (1967).
47. Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 140.
48. Id. at 140. 
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  270 4/15/20  8:48 AM




    
     
   
  
 
   
    
   
     
   
    
  
   
     
   
   
     
    
     
  
     
 
    
   
    
   
    
   
 
    
    





   
   
 
548 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
enrolling at the University of Mississippi, despite a court decree allowing 
the student to attend.49 Without giving reasons, the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed the lower court and found that actual malice was not
required, but the Supreme Court reversed.50 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the influential role public 
figures play in society warrants the same burden that is imposed upon
public officials; thus, public figures are subject to the actual malice
requirement.51 Chief Justice Warren noted in his concurrence that public
figures benefit from their command over public interest, access to media
channels, and opportunity to rebut false statements similar to that of public
officials.52 The Court, however, did not set forth a method for
distinguishing public figures from private citizens.53 
After Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Supreme Court altered the
application of the actual malice requirement in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.54 Although the Supreme Court later overturned 
Rosenbloom, the plurality in Rosenbloom primarily focused on whether 
the underlying event was one of public or general concern, rather than 
whether the plaintiff was a private individual or a public figure.55 The 
Supreme Court favored a public controversy analysis over the access-to-
media test.56 The Rosenbloom principles presented an opportunity to focus
primarily on the type-of-controversy analysis, rather than the type-of-
plaintiff, in a new, effective test. Although the principles in Rosenbloom
49. Id.
50. Id. at 142. 
51. Id. at 155. 
52. Id. The decision in Curtis Publishing resulted in a mix of concurring and 
dissenting opinions. See id. at 133 (Justice Harlan announced the opinion, joined 
by Justice Clark, Justice Stewart, and Justice Fortas); Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring); Id. at 170 (Black, J., and Douglas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Id. at 172 (Brennan, J., and White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).
53. See generally Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. 130 (Harlan, J., plurality).
54. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 29 n.1 (1971) (citing to a
string of cases and demonstrating that many cases, beginning with New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, involved plaintiffs who were public officials or figures 
suing newspapers or magazines). Here, the Court applied the standard to a case in
which the plaintiff was a private individual who made statements regarding an
issue of public or general interest. See id. at 31.
55. Id. at 43.
56. Id. at 43. The access-to-media test later became the standard. Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  271 4/15/20  8:48 AM




   
  
     
  
   
     
    
     
     
   
    
   
   
   
  
   
 




   
 
  
   
      
  
    
    
    
       
  
 
   
   
   
    
5492020] COMMENT
were short-lived due to the Gertz decision, the rationale may still be viable
for a more flexible defamation framework.57 
B. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Its Progeny, and Public Figure Classification
The application of actual malice to public figures, as well as to public 
officials, opened the door to the problem of distinguishing between public
and private figures.58 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court sought to 
create a plaintiff-status calculus to ease the application of New York
Times.59 Elmer Gertz, a prominent Chicago attorney, represented the
family of a deceased youth in a civil trial.60 When an article in the
American Opinion referred to him as a “Leninist” and a “communist-
fronter” and alleged that he had a criminal record, Gertz brought suit.61 
The district court found in favor of the defendant: although Gertz was 
not a public figure or public official, the burden of proving actual malice 
applied to Gertz because the discussion surrounded a public issue.62 The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.63 The Supreme Court
thereafter reversed the Seventh Circuit and determined that plaintiffs who
are private citizens are not required to prove that the defendant made the 
false statement with actual malice, even when the controversy is one of 
public concern.64 The Supreme Court found that Gertz was not a public
figure because he did not play a role in the criminal prosecution, nor did 
he discuss the criminal or civil litigation with the press.65 The Court’s
57. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323. The decision in a later case, Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. 
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 475 U.S. 767 (1986), refocused the test on the “form,
content, and context of the relevant speech.” Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. 
Supreme Court Tort Reform: Limiting State Power to Articulate and Develop Tort
Law – Defamation, Preemption, and Punitive Damages, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1189,
1227 (2006).
58. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 325.
61. Id. at 326. This article discussed the criminal trial in which Gertz was not
involved, not the civil trial in which Gertz was directly involved. The article 
alleged that the conviction of a police officer in the criminal trial was the result of 
a “Communist conspiracy to discredit local police” and, further, that Gertz played 
a part in “arrang[ing the officer’s] ‘frame-up.’” Id. at 323. 
62. Id. at 329. 
63. Id. at 332.
64. Id. at 348.
65. Id. at 352.
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  272 4/15/20  8:48 AM





   







    
   
  
   
    
     
   




   
     
      
  
   
 
 
   
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
   
  
    
    
550 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
emphasis on the plaintiff’s status abrogated the type of controversy-
focused conclusion set forth in Rosenbloom.66 
Two types of public figures developed as a result of the Gertz decision:
universal public figures and limited-purpose public figures.67 Universal 
public figures have a substantial amount of notoriety and influence; thus,
they are public figures for all purposes.68 On the other hand,
limited-purpose public figures are those who “have thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the 
resolution of the issues involved” and must prove actual malice for
statements concerning the particular public controversy.69 The Court also
addressed an important problem by articulating the differences between
public figures and private individuals.70 The Gertz Court addressed two 
major distinctions between public figures and private figures: whether the
individuals had access to means of rebuttal and whether they availed
themselves to greater public scrutiny.71 
The Supreme Court first identified persons who invite higher levels of 
scrutiny, attention, and comment as public figures.72 Public figures
effectively give up some of their rights to privacy and expose themselves
in a way that private individuals do not.73 Like public officials, public
figures knowingly accept this consequence by pursuing public notoriety 
or inserting themselves into conversations about public controversies.74 
In addition, the Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff had
access to means of “self-help.”75 Public figures readily refute false
statements through their access to the media; thus, they can counteract
some of the negative effects of defamation.76 The access and control over
the media that public figures exert leaves them less vulnerable to injury 
than private figures who do not enjoy the same access to the media.77 The
contemporary methods of production limited the media at the time of
Gertz: print and broadcast networks provided both the means for
66. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
67. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 350.
71. Id. at 351–52.
72. Id. at 344–45.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 346.
75. Id. In the eyes of the Supreme Court, self-help is the ability to counteract
false declaration through “channels of effective communication.” Id. at 344.
76. Id.
77. Id.
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  273 4/15/20  8:48 AM




   
     
    
   
 
    
    
  




   
     
   
   
 
   
    
  
   
  
   
    
 
   
     
 
   
   
  
 
    
    
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
5512020] COMMENT
publication of defamatory statements and the means for a plaintiff’s self-
help efforts.78 Today, plaintiffs have access to traditional print and
broadcast, along with social media and other online outlets.79 When
deciding Gertz, the Supreme Court was unable to consider the wide variety
of media available today; therefore, the ruling in Gertz is less applicable
in the present age.80 
The Court struggled to clarify the concept of access to media in 
Hutchinson v. Proxmire.81 In Hutchinson, the plaintiff was a scientist who 
used grant money to research objective measures of aggression among 
animals.82 United States Senator William Proxmire awarded the plaintiff
the Senator’s “Golden Fleece of the Month Award,” an “award” reserved
for “the most egregious examples of wasteful governmental spending.”83 
Further, the Senator referred to the plaintiff’s research as worthless, a 
waste of taxpayer money, and “monkey business” in speeches to the 
Senate.84 Both television programs and newsletters that the Senator sent
out discussed these speeches and the award.85 The plaintiff then filed suit 
for defamation.86 The district court found that no evidence existed to
establish actual malice and granted summary judgment in favor of the
Senator.87 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the ruling, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.88 The 
Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff was not a public figure; thus,
the Court did not require the plaintiff to prove actual malice.89 In relevant
part, the Court reasoned that although the plaintiff had published research,
his ability to respond to Senator Proxmire was limited, and he did not
possess the “regular and continuing access” from which public figures
78. Ann E. O’Connor, Access to Media All A-Twitter: Revisiting Gertz and 
the Access to Media Test in the Age of Social Networking, 63 FED. COMM. L.J.
507, 514 (2011).
79. See Simon Kemp, Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 
Billion Mark, WE ARE SOCIAL (Jan. 30, 2018), https://wearesocial.com/blog/2018
/01/global-digital-report-2018 [https://perma.cc/7PMA-UKPW] (last visited on
Sept. 20, 2018).
80. O’Connor, supra note 78, at 514. 
81. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 136 (1979).
82. Id. at 116.
83. Id. at 114.
84. Id. at 111. 
85. Id. at 116. 
86. Id. at 114.
87. Id. at 120. 
88. Id. at 112. 
89. Id. at 136. 
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552 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
benefit.90 The Hutchinson definition emphasizes reoccurring access, in
contrast to the main benefit of self-help addressed in Gertz.91 This
definition also fails to articulate what “media” is or how courts should
adjust to technological advances in the future.92 
II. USING THE INTERNET TO DO MOST EVERYTHING93 
Gertz v. Robert Welch introduced the concept of access to the media,
but the opinion limited technology to the notion of print and broadcast
networks.94 The Supreme Court could not have anticipated the effect that
rapid advancements in technology would have on all aspects of individual 
privacy. Moreover, technology has, in other areas of the law, forced the 
Court to update old standards to reflect the current state of media.95 
Specifically, the Court did not foresee that a plaintiff’s access to media
would expand from the traditional modes of access, such as print and
broadcast outlets, to methods of direct, instantaneous engagement with
one’s following, such as social media interaction.96 In addition, the 
increased breadth of information readily available has revealed the need to
reassess the balance between the “breathing space”97 required for robust
debate98 and the privacy rights of individuals.
90. Id.
91. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
92. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136. 
93. “Today we use the Internet to do most everything. Smartphones make it
easy to keep a calendar, correspond with friends, make calls, conduct banking,
and even watch the game.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 
(2018).
94. See generally Gertz, 418 U.S. 323.
95. For example, the Supreme Court recently adapted privacy standards
concerning Fourth Amendment rights to 21st century technology. In Carpenter v.
United States, the Court held that the government was required to obtain a warrant
because acquiring an individual’s cell phone location data amounted to a Fourth
Amendment search. 129 Fed. Cl. 558 (2016). Similarly, the Court will need to adjust 
prior standards regarding defamation to reflect the changing atmosphere of media.
For other examples of rapid development, see The 65 Best Inventions of the Past 65 
Years, POPULAR MECHANICS (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.popularmechanics
.com/technology/gadgets/a341/2078467/ [https://perma.cc/V9V3-KG9Y].
96. See generally Hutchinson, 443 U.S. 111 at 136.
97. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
98. Id. at 270 (“Thus we consider this case against the background of a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”). 
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5532020] COMMENT
A. Breadth and Depth of Information Available 
Open debate and discussion are critical to keeping the public informed 
and educated on current events.99 The media performs a major role in 
disseminating this information to the public.100 As the media that began as 
purely print evolved into broadcast,101 new media “ha[s] such a hold on
the American imagination that newspapers and other print media found 
themselves having to adapt.”102 Print and broadcast outlets were the main 
sources of media at the time of Gertz and remain popular means of
communication, but between 1984 and 2013, the United States
experienced exponential growth in internet technology and use.103 As of 
2018, nearly 88% of Americans have regular access to the internet.104 The 
internet gives users access to a wider breadth of information, both 
geographically and historically, than what was available in 1964 and has
99. See generally id.
100. Id.
101. America’s first daily newspaper began circulation shortly after the founding 
of the United States. See Understanding Media and Culture: An Introduction to Mass
Communication Chapter 1.3 Evolution of Media, U. MINN. LIBR., http://open.lib
.umn.edu/mediaandculture/chapter/1-3-the-evolution-of-media/ [https://perma.cc/GT
52-LPVQ] (last visited on Sept. 20, 2018). Citizens began to depend on the
newspapers for information regarding the political climate in the country. Id. As the
country developed, radio and television became the latest and greatest in media. Id. 
102. Transitions from one technology to another have greatly affected the
media industry, although it is difficult to say whether technology caused a cultural
shift or resulted from it. The ability to make technology small and affordable
enough to fit into the home is an important aspect of the popularization of new 
technologies. Id.
103. Susan Gunelius, The History and Evolution of the Internet, Media, and 
News in 5 Infographics, ACI INFO. GROUP (Oct. 24, 2013), https://aci.info/2013/
10/24/the-history-and-evolution-of-the-internet-media-and-news-in-5-infographics/
[https://perma.cc/4UYH-BXH4] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018). The technological
development of the internet began in 1969—around the time of the Gertz decision— 
but was far from available for public use. Reno v. ACLU, 520 U.S. 844, 849–50 
(1997) (discussing the rise of the internet, beginning with the use of the internet solely 
by the military and evolving to use by the public); Susan Gunelius, The History and
Evolution of the Internet, Media, and News in 5 Infographics, ACI INFO. GROUP (Oct.
24, 2013), https://aci.info/2013/10/24/the-history-and-evolution-of-the-internet-
media-and-news-in-5-Finfographics/ [https://perma.cc/DP66-E9WA] (demonstrating
that the internet did not begin to explode until the 1990s, with approximately 50
million users by 1998).
104. See Kemp, supra note 79.
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554 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
given reporters a greater ability to research before reporting on historical
controversies.105 
Due to the internet, geographic location does not restrict users’ access 
to a plethora of news sources.106 Consumers are no longer limited to local
newspapers and regional subscriptions; rather, consumers now have
access to publications from all over world.107 Users can now navigate to a
free website from the comfort of their homes and can search by name,
keyword, or year for news sources. In the past, this same user had to dig
through files of physically archived articles.108 In addition, information on
the internet is permanent, and thus accessible information is unrestrained
by time.109 For example, websites digitally archive newspaper articles.110 
This “vast library including millions of readily available and indexed 
publications” provides speakers with a new source for research that they
can use when reporting on historical controversies.111 Additionally, the
internet has opened a new channel of effective communication: social 
media. Although these technological developments have led to major
changes in the media industry, the law on defamation does not account for
any new types of media.112 
B. Traditional Access to Media
A cornerstone of a plaintiff’s designation as a public figure is the 
plaintiff’s ability to use the media as a method of rebuttal.113 Plaintiffs who 
have greater access to media, specifically public figures, are able to rebut 
false claims on a larger platform and are able to use the media as an avenue 
of dissemination.114 Thus, public figures are less vulnerable to injury than 
105. Reno, 520 U.S. at 849–50.
106. Id. at 850. Note, however, that certain countries and regions limit their 
citizens’ ability to freely use and access the internet and various news sources. 
107. Id. at 851 (“Taken together, these tools constitute a unique medium— 
known to its users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no particular geographical location 
but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.”). 
108. Reno, 520 U.S. 844 at 851 (“Anyone with access to the Internet may take 
advantage of a wide variety of communication and information retrieval methods.”).
109. See generally Amy Gajda, Privacy, Press, and the Right to be Forgotten 
in the United States, 93 WASH. L. REV. 201, 264 (2018). 
110. See NEWSPAPER ARCHIVE, https://newspaperarchive.com [https://perma.
cc/33LB-EUTF] (last visited on Sept. 20, 2018). 
111. Id.
112. Understanding Media and Culture: An Introduction to Mass 
Communication Chapter 1.3 Evolution of Media, supra note 101.
113. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
114. Id.
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5552020] COMMENT
private figures.115 Courts must adapt to the modern means of media but do
not need to altogether abandon the Gertz principles.116 In some ways,
online channels function in the same way as the traditional media. Many 
people, particularly those in younger generations, turn to online sources to 
receive their news, making online sources effective platforms for rebuttal 
of false statements.117 Likewise, many public figures turn to online
channels to refute false claims.118 For example, a public figure may rebut
a false statement through an official statement or interview either written
and posted on an online news forum or videoed and uploaded to a
streaming site.119 
These online channels are similar to an interview printed in a 
newspaper or broadcasted through a network. In fact, many traditional 
media sources have implemented online versions.120 In the new media age,
public figures still exert a level of access to channels of effective
communication greater than that of their private counterparts.121 Thus,
courts must continue to consider Gertz because traditional means of access
still exist, offering public figures an avenue of rebuttal and broad
115. See id.
116. The Supreme Court had no way of envisioning the future of media. In 
Curtis Publishing, the Court referenced “newspapers, magazines, and 
broadcasting companies.” Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 146 (1967) 
(quoting Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F. 2d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1967)).
The articulated list was, however, unlikely to be exclusive.
117. Paul Grabowicz, Tutorial: The Transition to Digital Journalism, U.S.
BERKELEY ADVANCED MEDIA INST. (2014), https://multimedia.journalism
.berkeley.edu/tutorials/digital-transform/ [https://perma.cc/7EVK-N2CX] (last
visited Sept. 19, 2018) (“Yet the trends are clear: people, especially the young,
are turning to the internet for more and more of their news and developing an
effective digital strategy is essential for long-term survival.”).
118. See generally O’Connor, supra note 78.
119. For example, James Franco turned to the television program Late Night
with Seth Meyers to address allegations of sexual misconduct. Matt Fernandez,
James Franco Further Addresses Sexual Misconduct Allegations on Seth Meyers,
VANITY FAIR (Jan. 11, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/james-franco-
sexual-harassment-allegations-late-night-with-seth-meyers-1202661504/ [https:/
/perma.cc/XY7B-VPZD].
120. Some major print newspapers that have created online counterparts
include The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. See WALL STREET J.,
https://www.wsj.com [https://perma.cc/55SR-FBL8] (last visited Sept. 28, 2019);
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com [https://perma.cc/5H6L-UCA2] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2019).
121. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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556 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
audiences.122 Due to the fact that online access differs from traditional
modes, Gertz is not the only principle that courts must consider.
C. Bypassing the Media: Access to Following
Historically, public figures could take to the streets and personally tell
people face-to-face that a claim was false, but public figures now have the
ability to instantaneously refute false claims from their laptop computers
or cell phones and send the message to all who follow her.123 Public figures
no longer solely rely on third parties to rebut false statements or promote 
themselves, their ideals, and their positions on issues of public concern.
A contemporary example demonstrates how having access to one’s 
following can garner national attention and become an effective means of
rebuttal. Taylor Swift took to Instagram, rather than news channels and
other media sources, to tell the world her opinion on an overwhelmingly 
controversial topic: politics.124 Swift’s single post quickly gained national
attention, obtained over 1.9 million “likes,”125 and reportedly caused a
spike in voter registration.126 The colossal reach of a single social media
post was unobtainable in an era of only print and broadcast media. Taking 
out a newspaper advertisement or a radio broadcast would not have likely
garnered the same level of interaction as Swift’s post.127 
122. See generally id.
123. Joe Trevino, From Tweets to Twibel: Why the Current Defamation Law
Does Not Provide for Jay Cutler’s Feelings, 19 SPORTS L.J. 49, 64 (2012) (“Web 
sites like Twitter have given all figures, public and private alike, the opportunity 
to be heard instantly the world over.”). 
124. Taylor Swift (@taylorswift), INSTAGRAM (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.
instagram.com/p/BopoXpYnCes/?hl=en&taken-by=taylorswift [https://perma.cc
/EM7E-Z4ZK]. Swift’s detailed caption dictated her personal views of candidates
who were running for the Senate and the House of Representatives in the 2018 
midterm election. Swift discussed each candidate’s views and ultimately stated
which candidate she would vote for. Swift concluded the post saying, “October 
9th is the LAST DAY to register to vote in the state of TN. Go to vote.org and
you can find all the info. Happy Voting!” Id.
125. Id.
126. Kevin Breuninger, Voter Registration Skyrockets After Taylor Swift’s 
Get-Out-to-Vote Push, CNBC (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/09 
/voter-registrations-skyrocket-after-taylor-swift-instagram-post.html [https://per
ma.cc/EE78-C2Z8].
127. Social media was not around at the time of Gertz or New York Times. In
fact, social media did not become popular until the early 2000s. Newspaper 
advertisements and radio broadcasts are comparable to a social media post
because each allows the individual to have control over what information is 
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5572020] COMMENT
The current law would likely be adequate if public figures similar to 
Taylor Swift were the only public figures bringing suit. The problem,
however, occurs when public figures attempt to retreat into private life. 
Lower courts have squabbled over whether public figures can shed the 
actual malice requirement by reverting to private figure status, and,
unfortunately, the Supreme Court remains silent.128 
III. FAIR GAME FOR ETERNITY?129 
The debate surrounding the potential to change status leads to much 
discussion, including calls for reform by Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas.130 Some scholars have gone as far as to develop the passage-of-
time rationale as an alternative solution.131 The passage-of-time rationale
is based on the idea that former public figures who have removed
themselves from the public sphere should regain the equivalent rights of
private citizens automatically after a certain number of years.132 
Additionally, commentators argue that the evidence needed for an “ex-
public figure” to prevail under the actual malice standard will disappear
over time; thus, after a passage of time, the public figure loses his status
completely.133 The passage-of-time hypothesis, however, is impractical
because an arbitrary number of years will fail to account for the
permanence of information available on the internet.134 
Many courts have already rejected the idea that public figures can shed
their status by the mere passage of time and have instead held that once a
displayed or announced. Advertisements, however, do not allow the direct 
interaction that social media posts do. See generally Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The 
Rise of Social Media, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Sept. 18, 2019), https://ourworld
indata.org/rise-of-social-media [https://perma.cc/DP55-CJXZ].
128. Ransom, supra note 23, at 416.
129. “Intuitively, one should not become fair game for eternity merely by
injecting oneself into the debate of the moment.” Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 
156 F.3d 57, 70 (1st Cir. 1998).
130. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari). Justice Thomas stated: “We should not continue to reflexively apply 
this policy-driven approach to the Constitution. Instead, we should carefully 
examine the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If the
Constitution does not require public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard 
in state-law defamation suits, then neither should we.” Id. at 676.
131. Ransom, supra note 23.
132. Id. at 416.
133. Id.
134. See supra Section II.A. 
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558 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
plaintiff is a public figure, he is always a public figure.135 The Supreme
Court, however, recognized the potential for a new rule.136 Specifically, in
Rosenblatt v. Baer, Justice Brennan noted, “there may be cases where a
person is so far removed from a former position of authority that comment
on the manner in which he performed his responsibilities no longer has the 
interest necessary to justify the New York Times rule.”137 Yet courts still
grapple with the ambiguous language of New York Times and Gertz in
determining public figure status in fact-sensitive scenarios. 
Plaintiffs who assert that they have relinquished their public figure 
status experience little success, as seen in Brewer v. Memphis Publishing 
Co.138 Brewer details the story of Anita Wood Brewer, a locally and 
nationally recognized entertainer and well-known ex-girlfriend of Elvis 
Presley.139 In connection with both her own talent and her relationship,
Brewer appeared on multiple nationwide television programs and
conducted extensive interviews.140 Roughly nine years prior to the article,
Anita Brewer married John Brewer and left the public eye.141 Brewer and 
her husband, a former professional athlete and college football star,
brought suit against a magazine that alleged Brewer was in a relationship 
with a married man.142 The Brewers argued that either: (a) they were never
public figures, or (b) they had each shed their public figure statuses for the 
purpose of an article concerning their private lives.143 After considering
the plaintiffs’ lack of access to media, the time between the Brewers’ fame
and the article, and the difficulty in clearly placing the plaintiffs in one
category, the Fifth Circuit still rejected the plaintiffs’ argument of status 
reversal.144 The court held that the plaintiffs were public figures for
135. See Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981); Brewer v.
Memphis Publ’g Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1248 (5th Cir. 1980); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 
383 U.S. 75 (1966); Time, Inc. v. Johnson, 448 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1971).
136. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87 (1966).
137. Id. at 87 n.14.
138. Brewer v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980).
139. Id. at 1248.
140. Id.
141. Id. (“[I]n 1964[,] Anita Wood married John Brewer and, with the
exception of possibly one television and one newspaper interview shortly
thereafter, did not seek media attention or continue as a professional entertainer 
from that time to the filing of this suit.”).
142. Id. at 1243. John Brewer was a member of the University of Mississippi 
football team. He later played from the Cleveland Browns for 1960–1967, and 
then for the New Orleans Saints from 1967–1970. His football career ended a
mere 2 years prior to the article. Id. at 1248.
143. Id. at 1249. 
144. Id. at 1257. 
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5592020] COMMENT
purposes of applying actual malice, regardless of their attempts to remove 
themselves from the public view.145 The court, however, recognized that
the need for a solution is evident when suggesting that retreat or passage
of time could result in the narrowing of the range of topics subject to the 
actual malice standard.146 This caveat paved the way for a new,
modernized solution to assist courts in properly applying the New York 
Times and Gertz standards.
IV. NAILING A JELLYFISH TO A WALL:147 THE 3-2 ACTUAL MALICE TEST
The influx of information available and the indefinite lifespan of an
online article undoubtedly complicates the already confusing
classification and permanence of public figure status for purposes of
defamation lawsuits. The 3-2 Test modernizes the current standards from 
New York Times and Gertz by implementing an approach that considers
the technological advancements of the last 50 years.148 Specifically, the 3-
2 Test narrows the topics protected under actual malice. The 3-2 Test can
assist courts in determining whether a public figure has the burden of
proving that the defendant acted with actual malice.149 
The 3-2 Test asks three questions. First, the court will determine 
whether the plaintiff was ever a public figure. If the plaintiff was at one
point a public figure, the court will move to the second question. The
second question will use two factors to assess whether the plaintiff is an
active or inactive public figure. The first factor considers the traditional 
notions of access available to the plaintiff. The second factor considers 
modern avenues of self-help. If the plaintiff is an active public figure, the 
court will require the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with actual
malice. If the plaintiff is inactive, the court will ask a third and final
question: is the alleged defamatory statement directly related to the 
controversy that led to the plaintiff’s original public figure status? If the 
court finds that the controversy surrounding the statement is directly
related to the controversy that gave rise to the plaintiff’s status, the court
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. “Defining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.”
Rosanova v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
148. See generally id. at 1238.
149. A majority of courts recognize that it is the court’s responsibility to
determine public figure status, not a duty of the jury. See id. at 1247 (citing
Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861–62 (5th Cir. 1978)).








560 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
will shift the burden of proof to the defendant to provide evidence that she
partook in due diligence to ensure truthfulness of the statement.150 
Figure 1. The Three-Question, Two-Factor Test (“3-2 Test”). 
The 3-2 Test will result in four possible plaintiff designations: 
(1) private plaintiffs; (2) active public figures; (3) inactive public figures 
with unrelated controversies; and (4) inactive public figures with related
controversies. The court’s designation of the plaintiff will determine
which party has the burden of proof. Additionally, this designation will
determine the level of proof that is necessary to prevail. 
150. The plaintiff will bear the burden of providing evidence that he is or is
not a public figure and that he is active or inactive. Typically, the plaintiff will 
want to prove that he is not a public figure or, alternatively, that he is inactive. 
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5612020] COMMENT
Figure 2. Potential Outcomes of the 3-2 Test.
Inactive Public Figure Active Public Figure





Shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show 
mere effort to determine truth of statements or to
show that the statements are based in opinion.
A. Question 1: No Difficulty in Distinguishing Among Defamation 
Plaintiffs151 
The first inquiry of the 3-2 Test uses the existing jurisprudential
standards to determine whether the plaintiff is, or at any time was, a public
figure or a public official. Courts can complete the first step by applying
the tests for general- and limited-purpose public figures set forth in 
Gertz.152 The court will look at the plaintiff’s access to means of “self-
help.”153 Plaintiffs with greater access to means of rebutting falsities are 
more likely public figures. Additionally, the court will consider each 
plaintiff’s level of public notoriety and whether the plaintiff placed himself
at the “forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved.”154 
If the plaintiff was never a public figure, the actual malice standard 
will not apply.155 Alternatively, if the plaintiff was a public figure at any
point during the plaintiff’s life, the court will proceed to the second
question and classify the plaintiff as an active public figure or as an 
inactive public figure. For example, because Geoffrey Owens was a public 
figure while on The Cosby Show, the court would move to Question 2.156 
B. Question 2: Not All Public Figures Are Created Equal 
The second question asks whether the public figure is an active public 
figure or an inactive public figure. To answer this question, the court will 
151. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
152. Id. at 351. 
153. See id.
154. Id. at 345. 
155. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
156. From Learning Lines to Serving the Long Line! The Cosby Show Star 
Geoffrey Owens Is Spotted Working as a Cashier at Trader Joe’s in New Jersey,
supra note 1.
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562 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
consider two factors: (1) whether the plaintiff is engaged in voluntary 
access to traditional methods of communication; and (2) whether the
public figure enjoys direct access to the public figure’s following. The first 
factor specifically considers the plaintiff’s interaction with media outlets,
including both traditional media forms and modern media sources, to
determine whether the plaintiff has the same level of access to the means
of rebuttal that the Gertz Court discussed. On the other hand, the second
factor examines the plaintiff’s individual ability to rebut false claims 
directly to her following. The plaintiff is an active public figure if she
satisfies either factor. In general, active public figures engage with and
intentionally communicate information to those with whom they have
notoriety. Conversely, inactive public figures are those who have 
withdrawn from the public eye and no longer have access to the media.157 
Those who do not actively seek out the media or use their prominence as
a platform are inactive and should be allowed the same privacy
considerations as a private person in a defamation suit. By categorizing 
public figures into two subcategories, the court will account for the loss of 
privacy rights that accompanies public notoriety while simultaneously
narrowing the class of plaintiffs subject to the actual malice standard.158 
1. Factor 1: Traditional Notions of Access in a Modern World
The first factor the court will consider is whether the plaintiff enjoys 
traditional means of access to the media.159 An active public figure is one
who vigorously and successfully seeks media attention and maintains the
ability to use media access to rebut false accusations. The Supreme Court
in Gertz articulated that public figures benefit from a greater access to
media that private citizens do not enjoy.160 This observation holds true
today. 
A court may find that a plaintiff has met the first factor in a multitude
of ways, including the plaintiff’s participation in interviews or guest
157. See Celebrities Who’ve Quit Social Media: Kayne West, Adele, Justin 
Bieber, More, NEWSDAY, https://www.newsday.com/entertainment/celebrities 
/celebrities-who-quit-social-media-1.12706108 [https://perma.cc/MJ7T-MFQN] 
(last updated Feb. 15, 2018) (demonstrating that some figures who have acquired 
fame have taken one proactive step, abstaining from social media, to withdraw 
from the public eye).
158. See generally Brewer v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 
1980).
159. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
160. Id. at 344.
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5632020] COMMENT
starring on radio talk shows and television programs.161 In these instances,
the public figure gives information to media sources and press outlets,
which subsequently distribute the information to readers or viewers.162 For
example, many public figures purposefully seek attention from media
sources to speak their minds through exclusive interviews163 or award
show speeches.164 In contrast, public figures who do not participate in the
creation of the story, such as being featured in paparazzi photos, do not 
meet the first factor. Because a plaintiff’s interaction with the media can 
be similar to the type of self-help from Gertz, plaintiffs who meet the first
factor are active public figures and are faced with the burden of proving
actual malice.165 
The court may find that a public figure acted in a way that satisfies the 
first factor for an active public figure. For example, in McKee v. Cosby,
the plaintiff, Katherine McKee, gave an interview to the Daily News in
which she declared that Bill Cosby raped her.166 In response, Cosby’s team
sent a letter to the Daily News asserting that McKee lacked credibility.167 
This letter appeared on news outlets around the world.168 McKee then 
sued, alleging defamation.169 McKee was clearly a public figure at one
161. See, e.g., text accompanying note 116.
162. The public figure’s voluntary action is in contrast to interactions in which
the public figure plays no role in creating, such as paparazzi photos or stories
written about the public figure without his participation.
163. McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
675 (2019). In McKee v. Cosby, the plaintiff participated in an interview to tell
her “#MeToo” story. Nancy Dillon, Bill Cosby Accused of Raping Ex-Girlfriend
of Sammy Davis, Jr., DAILY NEWS (Dec. 22, 2014, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/news/national/bill-cosby-accused-raping-ex-girlfriend-sammy-davis-
jr-article-1.2052890 [https://perma.cc/X4TP-8VLE].
164. Meryl Streep took to the Golden Globes to discuss her political views,
demonstrating her ability to access the media. See Daniel Victor and Giovanni
Russonello, Meryl Streep’s Golden Globes Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/08/arts/television/meryl-streep-golden-globes
-speech.html [https://perma.cc/V3QC-VJJH].
165. Courts have interpreted the heightened burden of actual malice in a
number of ways. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); see
also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (“false statements made with
[a] high degree of awareness of their probable falseness”); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731–32 (1968) (“the defendant in fact entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his publications.”).
166. McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2017).
167. Id. at 59.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 58.
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564 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
point because she was a famous actress and a showgirl for over 50 years.170 
She gained great notoriety in her field to the point of becoming a
household name during her prime.171 The United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, however, found that regardless of McKee’s past 
status, she was now a limited-purpose public figure for the specific
purposes of the interview and her rape allegations.172 The court’s analysis
hinged on deciding that the rape allegations surrounding Cosby were a
matter of public concern, rather than private.173 
The 3-2 Test would simplify the court’s analysis. As McKee was at
one point a general public figure, the court would answer the first question
affirmatively and move on to the first active public figure factor.174 The
court would then consider whether McKee utilized traditional means of
access to the media. McKee voluntarily approached the news outlet and 
conducted an exposé interview in which she shared her “#MeToo” 
story.175 The fact that she easily obtained an interview demonstrates her
ample ability to access the media and, furthermore, her potential ability to
use the media to rebut false claims. The Gertz Court considered and
foresaw this type of action.176 Because the first factor is met, the court
would find that McKee is an active public figure under the second 
question.177 As an active public figure under the test, McKee would be
subject to proving the defendant acted with actual malice.178 
On the other hand, Street v. National Broadcasting Co. illustrates a 
situation in which a plaintiff would fail the first active public figure
170. See generally id.
171. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, 627 F.2d 1287, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
172. McKee, 874 F.3d 54 at 62.
173. Id. at 61.
174. Id. at 58.
175. Id. The MeToo movement began in 2007 when women began using the
hashtag “#MeToo” on social media to share stories of sexual assault. The
movement enabled women to stand in solidarity with one another. Additionally,
the movement has brought attention to large issues, including sexual assault in the 
workplace. About, ME TOO MOVEMENT (2018), https://metoomvmt.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/7X6F-Y7G9]. For more information and a discussion of other
legal implications of the MeToo movement, see Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal 
Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229 (2018). 
176. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
177. Dillon, supra note 163.
178. The First Circuit ultimately found that McKee was a limited-purpose
public figure because the sexual allegations against Cosby were matters of public 
controversy. McKee, 874 F.3d 54 at 62. Under the new test, McKee would be 
subject to the actual malice standard based on her own voluntary actions of
seeking out the media.
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5652020] COMMENT
factor.179 In Street, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
addressed two major issues: (1) whether the plaintiff was a public figure 
during the controversial event; and (2) whether the plaintiff remained a
public figure 40 years later.180 The plaintiff, Victoria Street, brought suit
after a historical drama recounting the events of the famous Scottsboro 
Boys rape trials181 portrayed her in a negative light.182 Street was the main 
witness in the trials and was a public figure at the time of the trials.183 The 
court unequivocally found that the plaintiff was a public figure at the time 
of the trials.184 The historical drama came to fruition 40 years after the
trials without Street’s influence, yet the court found that she remained a 
public figure.185 The court reasoned that the plaintiff was a crucial 
character in what remains a “living controversy” because the discussion of
the Scottsboro Boys continued years later and will continue to be a matter
of public concern.186 Conversely, under the 3-2 Test, the court would 
recognize that Street effectively withdrew from the public eye, did not
participate in interviews, and became somewhat secluded.187 
Consequently, Street would not meet the first factor, and the court would 
move on to analyze the second factor. 
2. Factor 2: Access to Following
Public figures who are unsuccessful at seeking traditional media 
attention may turn to other avenues of access to interact with and 
disseminate rebuttals to their fans. This direct communication, rather than 
through news and media sources, gives the public figure a new means of
self-help. Courts, therefore, must consider whether the public figure is 
179. Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981).
180. Id. at 1234–35.
181. The Scottsboro trials created turmoil throughout the 1930s. Nine African 
American youths were accused of raping two white women while traveling from 
Tennessee to Alabama. These allegations led to a trial in Alabama, in which all 
were sentenced to death. The Supreme Court reversed all convictions due to Sixth 
Amendment violations. In one of the retrials, the trial court judge set aside the
jury’s guilty verdict. Other retrials were overturned due to a lack of African 
Americans on the juries. See id. at 1230.
182. Id. at 1229.
183. Id. at 1234.
184. Id. (“[P]laintiff was a public figure under Gertz because she played a
major role, had effective access to the media and encouraged public interest in
herself.”). 
185. Id. at 1235.
186. Id. at 1236.
187. Id. at 1230.
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566 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
voluntarily engaging with her audience by exerting control over 
information given straight to the public. Active public figures are those
who use their platforms to promote themselves, their ideals, and their 
positions on issues of public concern.188 Plaintiffs may meet the second 
active public figure factor by using social media to share news, promote 
topics unrelated to their careers, or refute false statements.189 These active
public figures are plaintiffs who make deliberate, non-incidental,190 and
direct contact with a public forum and therefore forfeit some of their 
privacy rights.191 
Street’s voluntary actions would not meet the second factor under the 
3-2 Test.192 No evidence demonstrates that Street used any of her personal
influence that she gained through her notoriety during the trials to rebut 
the drama’s portrayal of her.193 The court decided Street in 1981; thus,
Street did not have access to social media.194 The facts, however, state that
Street withdrew from the public to such an extent that the drama’s
producers believed she was deceased at the time of broadcasting.195 Her
contact with the media was nonexistent at that point, and she did not take 
188. Engagement with one’s following may include, but is not limited to,
hosting meet-and-greets; actively engaging on social media through commenting,
vlogging, and similar avenues; and hosting social media “live” segments where a
public figure instantaneously responds to questions. It is also important to note
that at this stage in the analysis, these considerations are not applicable to private 
individuals, many of whom do try to promote themselves. 
189. For example, Taylor Swift actively seeking media coverage to respond to 
defamatory statements of Kayne West in his song “Famous” would satisfy the
second public figure factor. See 2016: The Year Social Media Replaced Celebrity 
P.R., VANITY FAIR (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2016/12/
celebrity-social-media-replacing-pr-publicists [https://perma.cc/2QTP-X9ZG]. 
190. For example, non-incidental activity includes posting statements and 
videos or going live on social media. On the other hand, a third party taking a
video of the plaintiff, and that video going “viral” as a meme, is incidental due to 
the plaintiff’s inability to control. See generally Cory Batz, Trending Now: The
Role of Defamation Law in Remedying Harm from Social Media Backlash, 44
PEPP. L. REV. 429 (2017).
191. Matthew Lafferman, Do Facebook and Twitter Make You a Public
Figure: How to Apply the Gertz Public Figure Doctrine to Social Media, 29 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 199, 242 n.281 (2002) (noting that 
some case law has pointed to deliberate, non-incidental action as “voluntary”).
Further, non-incidental contact exceeds the contact of an average individual’s
private life. Id. at 243, n.284.
192. See Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981).
193. See id.
194. See generally id.
195. Id. at 1230.
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5672020] COMMENT
any affirmative steps to distribute her version of the story to people 
directly.196 Her interactions and access to any following or fans would be
minimal, if she had interactions at all. Street’s effective withdrawal from 
the public would render her an inactive public figure under the 3-2 Test. 
Public figures not seeking media attention and not directly engaging
with their followers do not exert the same level of control and access to
the media as active public figures.197 These inactive public figures may 
maintain social media accounts, but they are merely acting as private 
citizens.198 If the court determines that the plaintiff does not meet either of
the factors, like Victoria Street, the plaintiff is an inactive public figure,
and the court should consider the third question of the 3-2 Test.
C. Question 3: The Role of the Historian Defendant in the 3-2 Test
Separating active public figures and inactive public figures alone does
not solve the problem at hand.199 Media reporters who reevaluate and 
republish past events and controversies, also known as historians, dredge 
up incidents to create headlines and garner viewership.200 An inactive 
public figure, therefore, is subject to the same level of invasive behavior
by the media as active public figures.201 
For example, in Street v. National Broadcasting Co., movie producers
revisited and recreated the plaintiff’s past into a historical drama.202 
Although the events occurred 40 years prior to the film, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that the plaintiff should have the burden of proving that the
defendant acted with actual malice because “although information may 
come to light over the course of time, the distance of years does not
necessarily make more data available to a reporter: memories fade;
witnesses forget; sources disappear.”203 Further, the court reasoned that the
passage of time should not limit free debate, but rather, the events that 
196. See id.
197. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
198. Ransom, supra note 23, at 417 (“Perhaps the true ex-public figure is
actually a hybrid, sharing in common with public figures the experience of having
once commanded the public’s attention while sharing in common with private
figures a greater vulnerability to injury.”).
199. Street, 645 F.2d 1227 at 1236 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
200. Id. (distinguishing the press and the historian, but asserting that the
Supreme Court demands protection for the uninhibited reporting by both). 
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1230.
203. Id. at 1236.
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568 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
occurred in the past are still relevant to vigorous and open debate in the
present.204 The court held that once a court determines that a plaintiff is a 
public figure, the public figure retains that status for all future commentary
of that controversy.205 
Considering modern developments, the Sixth Circuit was mistaken in
stating that the passage of time “does not necessarily make more data 
available to a reporter.”206 With modern technology, media, and online
permanence, reporters have access to significantly more information than
in 1981, the year of the Street decision.207 It remains important for courts
to allow historians the same “breathing room” that courts give to
contemporaneous reporters, but courts must also ensure due diligence and
promote responsibility of historians to report history with accuracy.208 
Unlike contemporaneous speakers, historians have both time and
opportunity to investigate.209 Further, the Sixth Circuit reasoned in Street
that “a nation that prizes its heritage need have no illusions about its
past.”210 Indeed, a nation that prizes its heritage should protect the past
from being incorrectly recounted and altered. 
Courts, therefore, should narrow the scope of topics historians may
report on under the protection of actual malice. To do so, courts should
ask the third and final question of the 3-2 Test: does the defamatory
statement relate directly to the public controversy that originally gave rise
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1235.
206. Id. at 1236. 
207. See Learn How Google Works in Gory Detail, PPCBLOG, http://www
.ppcblog.com/how-google-works/ [https://perma.cc/28BJ-SVTW] (last visited Oct.
10, 2018) (detailing the process in which Google is able to scan the web using a
“series of simultaneous calculations requiring only a fraction of a second” and
resulting in thousands of web pages relevant to one’s search terms); Mohammad
Reza Soleymani et al., The Effect of Internet Addiction on the Information-Seeking
Behavior of the Postgraduate Students, 28 MATERIA SOCIO-MEDICA 191, 191–92 
(2016) (“Internet helps a wide range of the researchers and the students to satisfy 
their information needs with no physical presence in the libraries or other
information centers.”). 
208. Street, 645 F.2d 1227 at 1236.
209. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 171 (1979) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“While historical analysis is no less vital to the
marketplace of ideas than reporting current events, historians work under different
conditions than do their media counterparts. A reporter trying to meet a deadline
may find it totally impossible to check thoroughly the accuracy of his sources. A
historian writing sub specie aeternitatis has both the time for reflection and the
opportunity to investigate the veracity of the pronouncements he makes.”).
210. Street, 645 F.2d 1227 at 1236.
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5692020] COMMENT
to the plaintiff’s public figure status and to the plaintiff’s participation in 
the controversy?211 
In Durham v. Cannan Communications, Inc., the Court of Appeals of 
Texas, Amarillo, demonstrated how to determine controversy 
relatedness.212 The plaintiff, an attorney in Amarillo, brought suit against
the defendant, a corporation owning a television broadcasting station, for 
two broadcasts that connected the plaintiff with a club.213 The club, called
the Chicken Ranch, doubled as a party house for orgies and prostitution.214 
Throughout his career, the plaintiff garnered a fair amount of local
notoriety and held a number of press conferences.215 For example, when 
the Attorney General appointed the plaintiff as special counsel for a court
of inquiry, which ultimately uncovered the mismanagement of county 
funds, the press frequently published articles about the plaintiff related to 
his job as special counsel.216 The court found that the plaintiff was a
limited-purpose public figure pertaining to those specific controversies.217 
The court continued to distinguish the controversy surrounding the
plaintiff’s notoriety from the controversy of the alleged defamatory
broadcasts.218 Because the defamatory statements regarding the Chicken 
Ranch were not directly related to the legal investigation that gave rise to
the plaintiff’s notoriety, the court determined that the plaintiff was not
required to prove that the defendant acted with actual malice.219 
Like the court in Durham, courts applying the 3-2 Test should 
distinguish between the controversy that gives rise to a plaintiff’s public
figure status and the controversy that is the subject of the alleged
defamation.220 In cases in which the public figure is inactive and the
controversy is unrelated to the controversy giving rise to the plaintiff’s 
public figure status, the court should hold the plaintiff to the same standard 
as a private party.221 For a plaintiff who is an inactive public figure where
the controversy is specifically related to her time as an active public figure,
211. See id. at 1235.
212. Durham v. Cannan Commc’ns, 645 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
213. Id. at 847. 
214. Id.
215. Id. at 850.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 851. 
218. Id. (“There is no evidence appellant’s alleged involvement with the
Chicken Ranch had anything to do with his legal and investigative activities for
the county government.”) 
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  292 4/15/20  8:48 AM




     
    
    
 
 
    
 
      
   
   
  
   
   












   
   
 
 
   
   
   
    
    
   
       
570 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
the burden of proof should shift to the defendant to show that he engaged 
in mere due diligence when reporting history. Shifting the burden of proof
to the defendant in cases of inactive public figures with related
controversies will not exploit the danger of media self-censorship that the 
Gertz Court feared.222 Instead, the 3-2 Test will encourage historians to 
dedicate the appropriate amount of time to diligently research history prior 
to publication and will further deter speakers from inaccurately depicting
historical controversies. 
In the example of Street, the court would use questions one and two to
easily classify Victoria Street as an inactive public figure under the 3-2 
Test.223 Thus, the court would turn to the third and final question: whether
the alleged defamation was directly related to the controversy that gave 
rise to the plaintiff’s public figure status. Here, the historical drama
portrayed the events that led to Street’s original notoriety.224 Because the
controversy is directly related to Street’s notoriety, the burden of proof
would shift to the defendant to present clear and convincing evidence of
either his diligent attempts to uphold the integrity of facts and accurately 
portray historical events, or his concerted effort to disclaim the portrayal
as based in opinion, rather than fact.225 
D. Applicability of the 3-2 Test
The 3-2 Test distinguishes active public figures from inactive public
figures and provides a new standard for inactive-related public figures.
Fact-specific judicial examinations, such as this new layer of analysis, may
lead to discrepancies among lower courts. For example, each factor of the 
3-2 Test is dependent on specific facts and the plaintiff’s actions. Thus,
two courts may view the plaintiff’s actions as inactive or active. The 
potential discrepancy within lower courts, however, is the downside of any 
jurisprudential test geared toward individuality rather than lumping
plaintiffs into clear groups. This proposed analysis is simpler than others,
however, because it forgoes overly subjective factors in favor of
straightforward factors.226 For example, a group of scholars proposed a test 
that focuses on the “relevancy of the private information to the public,” 
whether the “information is necessary to learning about the world,” and
222. Id. at 350. 
223. See supra Section IV.B.2.
224. Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1236 (6th Cir. 1981).
225. Id.
226. See generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Ben Zion Lahav, Public Interest
v. Private Lives—Affording Public Figures Privacy in the Digital Era: The Three
Principle Filtering Model, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 975, 1000–01 (2017).
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5712020] COMMENT
proportionality.227 Each of these principles is important, but it is easy to 
foresee that courts will differ in opinions of relevance, necessity, and 
proportionality.228 In comparison, the questions in the 3-2 Test ask the 
court to point to specific actions of the plaintiff in order to characterize
them as active or inactive. 
The 3-2 Test provides a simple, step-by-step analysis that courts can
follow and will consistently lead to a result that balances the interests of
the plaintiff and defendant. By separating public figures into active and
inactive categories and then shifting the burden of proof to the defendant 
in certain cases, courts can forge a middle ground between negligence and 
actual malice. This test defines some of the gray area between the actual
malice standard and the standard courts apply to private individuals,
allowing public figures who no longer possess means of self-help some
protection from defamatory statements.
CONCLUSION
The digital revolution has improved the traditional means of
communication and has created new avenues of media access.229 Courts
are desperately in need of guidance when applying New York Times and
Gertz to modern-day cases. Additionally, the digital revolution provides
historical reporters with a greater responsibility to report history 
accurately.230 Technology has advanced, but defamation law has remained
relatively static. Creating an updated analysis is crucial to account for the 
changing media landscape.
Adopting the 3-2 Test will streamline the judicial analysis of cases and
allow for more consistent applications of New York Times and Gertz. 
Plaintiffs like Geoffrey Owens, who were once at the center of controversy
but no longer have access to means of self-help, deserve to find redress in
court. These inactive public figures have somewhat regained their privacy,
only to have reporters, who fail to take proactive steps to ensure
truthfulness or to represent the article as one of opinion, exploit their
stories. A passage-of-time solution creates too narrow a protection for the
227. Id. “According to the proportionality test, the relevant question is whether
one can satisfy a legitimate public interest with a less invasive action, which 
avoids harming the rights of others involved . . . . For example, it may be
proportionate to publish facts about medical diseases or a crime without pictures
of the victims or other irrelevant identifiable information.” Id. at 1006. 
228. Id.
229. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Shearer &
Gottfried, supra note 15.
230. See supra Section II.A.
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572 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
press and may inadvertently discourage historians from reporting
historical events. Thus, dividing public figures according to their actions
becomes the most plausible solution because it balances the rights of 
individuals with the rights of the press. In situations like that of Geoffrey
Owens, where an inactive public figure has lost his voice to refute false 
statements, the inactive public figure should not have to prove that a 
defendant acted with actual malice. Instead, shifting the burden of proof 
to the defendant to show that she engaged in due diligence will hold
reporters to an appropriate standard of care while leaving the breathing
room necessary for debate.
